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DOUBLADE: Unknown Vulnerability Detection in Smart Contracts Via Abstract
Signature Matching and Refined Detection Rules
Abstract
With the prosperity of smart contracts and the blockchain
technology, various security analyzers have been proposed
from both the academia and industry to address the associated
risks. Yet, there does not exist a high-quality benchmark of
smart contract vulnerability for security research. In this study,
we propose an approach towards building a high-quality vul-
nerability benchmark. Our approach consists of two parts.
First, to improve recall, we propose to search for similar vul-
nerabilities in an automated way by leveraging the abstract
vulnerability signature (AVS). Second, to remove the false
positives (FPs) due to AVS-based matching, we summarize
the detection rules of existing tools and apply the refined rules
by considering various defense mechanisms (DMs). By inte-
grating AVS-based code matching and the refined detection
rules (RDR), our approach achieves higher precision and re-
call. On the collected 76,354 contracts, we build a benchmark
consisting of 1,219 vulnerabilities covering five different vul-
nerability types identified together by our tool (DOUBLADE)
and other three scanners. Additionally, we conduct a compar-
ison between DOUBLADE and the others, on an additional
17,770 contracts. Results show that DOUBLADE can yield a
better detection accuracy with similar execution time.
1 Introduction
Powered by the blockchain technique [8], smart contract [36]
has attracted plenty of attention and have been applied in var-
ious industries, e.g., financial service, supply chains, smart
traffic, and IoTs. Among the languages for the smart con-
tract, Solidity is now the first choice, owing to its popularity
and simplicity. However, in versions before Solidity 0.5.0,
little security consideration is presented in its language tool
chains [43]. Besides loose security checks, some special fea-
tures of Solidity (e.g., fallback functions) also exacerbate this
problem,making smart contracts prone to errors and vulner-
abilities. The public has witnessed several severe security
incidents, including the notorious DAO attack [49] and Parity
wallet hack [39]. According to the previous reports [5, 7], up
to 16 types of security vulnerabilities were found in Solidity
programs. These security issues undermine the confidence
people have in executing transactions via smart contracts and
eventually affect the trusts towards the blockchain ecosystem.
Witnessing the severity and urgency of this problem, re-
searchers and security practitioners have made endeavors to
develop automated security scanners. According to our sur-
vey, there exist at least 13 scanners, most of which adopt
the rule-based or verification-based methods for vulnerabil-
ity detection. SLITHER [47] and OYENTE [33] are among
the most popular open-source analysis tools that are publicly
available. Besides, there are also several recently published
security tools such as ZEUS [25], SMARTCHECK [44], SE-
CURIFY [48], etc. Each of them has its own advantages and
limitations, covering various vulnerability types. Notably, the
term vulnerability in this study refers to the security issues
exploitable by external attackers, not including unexploitable
style issues and code smells (e.g., bad naming conventions in
SLITHER and unspecified version issue in SMARTCHECK).
Although various scanners are available, to the best of our
knowledge, there still does not exist a high-quality benchmark
for vulnerable smart contracts yet. Building such a benchmark
is a non-trivial task, as the real-world scanners may be neither
sound nor complete. The reasons come from twofold. First,
the detection rules may be out-of-date. As developers become
aware of possible vulnerabilities and the corresponding at-
tacks, they often add some defense mechanisms (DMs) in
code for the purpose of prevention (see examples in §6.2).
However, most of the existing scanners fail to consider DMs
in code, causing FPs. Second, programs on Ethereum may
be logically similar. Hence, code cloning [41] also widely
exists across smart contracts [35] (see examples in Fig. 1
and Fig. 10). Still, the existing scanners ignore the cloning
phenomenon, causing FNs. Hence, purely relying on existing
scanners to build a high-quality benchmark is problematic.
To further support the argument that code cloning widely
exists in smart contracts, we conduct a textual-similarity anal-
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Figure 1: File similarity for smart contracts from 18,714
Ethereum accounts.
ysis on our collected 76,354 contracts from 18,714 accounts
in Ethereum. We compile the contracts from the same account
by alphabetical order of contract name into a textual file, and
apply the well-known clone detection tool CCFINDER [26] to
find their pairwise textual similarity. Surprisingly, as shown
in Fig. 1, we find that at least 47.9% files hold a ≥ 60% simi-
larity with some other file. Especially, 8.6% account files are
exactly the same. The reason is twofold: 1) the logic behind
Solidity programs could be generally similar; 2) new devel-
opers may browse and copy existing contracts’ code. Hence,
as VUDDY [27] is effectively applied for identifying similar
buggy code via matching code signatures for C language, it is
desirable to have a tool of using the known bug signatures to
find more similar unknown bugs in smart contracts. However,
we find that none of the existing tools take into account code
similarity matching.
The code-similarity based buggy code search helps provide
more bug candidates and therefore improves the recall. Mean-
while, the similarity-based code search may bring many false
positives (FPs), owing to the observation that the fixed code
with DMs is often syntactically similar to the original vulner-
able code. Hence, during the process of similarity-based code
search, it is inevitable to retrieve many clones of safe code
with DMs, and they should be eliminated from the detection
results via some automated approach.
In this paper, we present a two-phase approach for building
the benchmark. The basic idea is shown in Fig. 2. First, we use
true positives (TPs) reported by the existing scanners as ab-
stract vulnerability signature (AVS), and apply (AVS)-based
code matching to automatically discover more candidates un-
known to the existing scanners — this step is to improve the
recall for building the vulnerability benchmark. Second, to
eliminate the code clones that are actually non-vulnerable
with DMs, manual inspection is conducted to summarize
those DMs in code, based on which the refined detection rules
(RDR) are summarized and applied to improve the precision
for the enlarged vulnerability benchmark. By integrating AVS
and RDR, we manage to build the vulnerability benchmark of
good precision and recall, with a high extent of automation
and acceptable manual efforts.
Technically, the AVS matching step consists of three steps
(§3). First, we choose three of the existing scanners to find
some concrete vulnerable samples and remove the FPs via
manual inspection (§4.2). Second, we employ the clustering
algorithm to group the similar vulnerable samples of the same
Figure 2: The idea of building vulnerability benchmark.
type and then extract AVS via code differencing algorithm
(§5.1). Third, we leverage the AVS to automatically search for
more concrete vulnerable samples via similar code matching
technique (§5.2). The technical novelty lies in the proposal
of AVS and AVS-based code matching algorithm to help
discover the similar vulnerabilities that could contain small
or big code gaps (§2). Note that AVS extraction is performed
on the clustering and differencing results.
For the RDR part, the major workload is to survey the
existing scanners and understand their internal detection rules.
It is inevitable to have some extent of manual inspection.
Hence, we build a team of four research staff, and three of
them have industrial working or internship experiences. After
two weeks’ training, the team started to utilize the existing
scanners. Starting with all open-sources scanners, we finally
chose SLITHER, OYENTE and SMARTCHECK (see details
in §4.1). The team spent in total five months on reading the
documentation and source code of the existing scanners, and
auditing the results to summarize the rules of scanners and
the DMs in code that cause FPs — finally formulate the RDR.
The formulation of RDR is an iterative process with the aid of
AVS and the existing scanners, as they all provide FPs with
DMs to fix the vulnerability in code (see details in §6.4).
To summarize, we make the following contributions:
1. We improve the detection recall, we propose a similar-
code matching algorithm on the basis of the AVS, which
helps to detect similar vulnerabilities containing big or
small gaps, given some existing known vulnerabilities.
2. We improve the detection precision, we propose to investi-
gate the three state-of-the-art scanners and summarize their
rules (if not documented). Beyond that, we summarize the
RDR considering the DMs in code that cause FPs.
3. On the 76,354 contracts collected from Etherscan, follow-
ing the workflow in Fig. 2, we publish a benchmark of five
types of vulnerabilities that consists of 1,219 vulnerabili-
ties. Details of the benchmark can be found at [6].
4. On the 17,770 contracts recently from Google, with the
final AVS and RDR, our tool (named DOUBLADE) is com-
pared with the four others. The results show DOUBLADE
yields the best accuracy on the five types of vulnerabilities.
To the best of our knowledge, we make the first attempt to
summarize and apply the DMs that are unconsidered by the ex-
isting scanners, and applying the similarity-based code match
for detection. Besides, vulnerability detection and benchmark
construction involve more than 90,000 contracts.
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1 contract Auction {
2 address currentLeader;
3 uint highestBid;
4 function bid() payable {
5 require(msg.value > highestBid);
6 require(currentLeader.send(highestBid)); // Refund
the old leader ,
7 currentLeader = msg.sender;
8 highestBid = msg.value; }
9 }
(a) CB1: an unexpected revert publicly reported by the blog [15].
1 contract AuctionPotato {
2 address public highestBidder;
3 mapping(address => uint256) public fundsByBidder;
4 ......
5 function placeBid() public payable returns (bool
success) {
6 fundsByBidder[highestBidder] = fundsByBidder[
highestBidder].add(potato);
7 highestBidder.transfer(fundsByBidder[highestBidder
]);
8 ...
9 highestBidder = msg.sender;
10 highestBindingBid = highestBindingBid.add(potato);
11 ...} }
(b) CB2: another unexpected revert from a real-world contract.
Figure 3: Two unexpected revert vulnerabilities with big gaps, which are missed by SLITHER, OYENTE and SECURIFY.
2 Background
In this section, we explain the five vulnerability types targeted
by our study. We show two real cases, which are not well-
handled by the state-of-the-art scanners, to motivate our study.
2.1 Vulnerability Types
Early in 2016, Atzei et al. [7] have observed 6 types of vul-
nerabilities that could exist in smart contracts. Recently, on
a public technical blog [5], a more detailed taxonomy for
vulnerabilities in Solidity code is summarized, accompanied
by preventative techniques (similar to DMs in this study) and
real-world examples. We list the five major vulnerability types
from the top-10 vulnerability types according to [15, 34].
1. Reentrancy. As the most famous Ethereum vulnerability,
reentrancy recursively triggers the fall-back function1 to
steal money from the victim’s balance or deplete the gas
of the victim. Reentrancy occurs when external callers
manage to invoke the callee contract before the execution
of the original call is finished, and it was mostly caused
by the improper usages of the function withdraw() and
call.value(amount)(). It was also reported in [7].
2. The Abuse of tx.origin. When the visibility is improperly
set for some key functions (e.g., some sensitive functions
with public modifier), the extra permission control then
matters. However, issues can arise when contracts use
the deprecated tx.origin (especially, tx.origin==owner) to
validate callers for permission control. It is relevant to the
access control vulnerability in [34].
3. Unchecked Low-level-call. In Solidity, users can use
low level functions call(), callcode(), delegatecall() and
send(). They are different from other Solidity functions, as
they will not throw exception or exit when encountering
errors. Instead, they continue to run and return a boolean
value false. Gasless send, one of the six vulnerability types
listed by [7], is related to this vulnerability.
1Fall-back function is a special function in Solidity, which has no function
names, parameters, and return values. It will be triggered when the function
signature does not match any of the available functions in a contract.
4. Unexpected Revert. In a smart contract, if some operations
unfortunately fail, the whole transaction will revert. So the
attacker could deliberately make some operations fail for
the purpose of denial of service (DoS). This is also termed
DoS with revert in [15].
5. Self-destruct Abusing. This vulnerability allows the attack-
ers to forcibly send Ether without triggering its fall-back
function. Normally, the contracts place important logic in
the fall-back function or making calculations based on a
contract’s balance. However, this could be bypassed via
the self-destruct contract method that allows a user to
specify a beneficiary to send any excess ether [15].
Scope of Our Study. According to [15, 34], there are other
vulnerability types: Time Manipulation (type 6), Arithmetic Is-
sues (type 7), Bad Randomness (type 8), Front-Running (type
9), and Short Address (type 10). In this paper, we focus on
the types of severe vulnerabilities that are not well-supported
by the existing scanners. After some preliminary study, we
find type 7, 8, 10 are relatively easy to detect by simple rules
of the existing scanners. For example, as long as unsigned
integers are used for arithmetic operations, there exist arith-
metic issues. When keccak256 or block.blockhash are used for
assignment, bad randomness happens. If the input address is
less than 20-byte, it leads to short address. Basically, these
rules have no FPs or FNs. Besides, type 9 (front-running) is
quite difficult to prevent, as it requires the understanding of
business logic inside a specific contract; type 6 is more like
a theoretic threat due to bad coding style. Thus, we target at
the first 5 types in this paper, as they are not well-supported
by existing scanners.
2.2 Example One — The Need for AVS
Similar code blocks (CBs) with small gaps (e.g., CBs
in Fig. 10) are well detected by clone detectors (e.g.,
CCFINDER [26] DECKARD [24] and NICAD [42] based on
editing distance) in software engineering community. In real-
ity, there exist many similar vulnerable CBs that just follow
common code patterns but differ greatly in concrete logic —
we refer to them as similar vulnerable code with big gaps.
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1 contract RegDocuments {
2 ** modifier onlyAdmin() {
3 if (msg.sender!= admin && msg.sender!=owner) revert();
4 ...;
5 } **
6 constructor() {
7 admin = msg.sender;
8 owner = 0xc238ff50c09787e7b920f711850dd945a40d3232;
9 }
10 function regstDocs(bytes32 _storKey) **onlyAdmin**
payable{
11 require(!registered);
12 uint _value = Storage.regPrice();
13 Storage.regstUser.value(_value)(_storKey);
14 registered = true;
15 }
16 }
Figure 4: CB3: a real case of using a self-defined modifier
(DM3), a FP of reentrancy for SLITHER and OYENTE. We
use ** ** to highlight the self-defined modifier.
At first glance, CB1 and CB2 in Fig. 3 are quite dif-
ferent, as their gaps (omitted statements) significantly out-
number their common statements. These two CBs can not
usually be detected by mainstream clone detectors such as
CCFINDER [26] and DECKARD [24] — their total similar-
ity is lower than the often used similarity threshold (e.g.,
70%). However, both of them are vulnerable and essentially
similar. For CB1 in Fig. 3a, an attacker can reassign the
leader address and make any refund to the address always
fail. By calling the bid() function, the attacker can exclu-
sively occupy the leader forever and achieve the goal of
DoS. Similarly, CB2 in Fig. 3b is also problematic, the at-
tacker could exploit it with the code shown in Fig. 16. When
highestBidder.transfer(fundsByBidder[highestBidder]) is exe-
cuted, the fallback function of the attacker will be triggered
and the revert will happen.
Interestingly, most of the existing scanners have no rules for
this. We propose the following rule to detect this vulnerability:(
dcl(adrg)∨dcl(var)
) adrg.trans f er(var)
(adrg = msg.sender)⇒ unexpected revert
(1)
where dcl(adrg) denotes the declaration of a public ad-
dress,  denotes the execution time order in the control flow,
adrg.trans f er(var) calls function trans f er() of that address,
and adrg = msg.sender reassigns the address of msg.sender
to adrg. This rule helps to detect some vulnerable samples but
it is incomplete to cover all other similar ones (e.g., changing
trans f er() to other functions for money transfer).
To sum up, Fig. 3 motivates the AVS design that detects
similar vulnerable CBs with an excellent recall and acceptable
precision, regardless of small or big gaps across them.
2.3 Example Two — The Need of RDR
In Fig. 4, we can see an FP of reentrancy reported by SLITHER
and OYENTE. SLITHER adopts Rule 2 to detect reentrancy.
r(varg)∨w(varg) externCallw(varg)⇒ reentrancy (2)
where r() and w() denote the write and read operations, re-
spectively; varg denotes a certain public global variable; de-
notes the execution time order in the control flow; externCall
denotes the external call to the money-transfer functions ex-
cept built-in functions send() and transfer(). In short, this
rule is to check: if there exists an external call to a money-
transfer function (***.value(_value)(_storKey)) and the call
is between the read and write operations to a state variable
(registered), a reentrancy may happen.
Similarly, CB3 is reported by OYENTE as vulnerable, ac-
cording to its run-time detection Rule 3 below:(
r(varg)∧ (gastrans > 2300)∧ (amtbal > amttrans)∧
varg is changad before external call
)⇒ reentrancy (3)
where gastrans > 2300 means the gas for transaction must be
larger than 2300, amtbal > amttrans means the balance amount
must be larger than transfer amount, and lastly the public
variable could be changed before external calls.
However, CB3 actually takes into account the security issue
and adds the self-defined modifier onlyAdmin() before the pos-
sibly vulnerable function regstDocs. As onlyAdmin() restricts
that a transaction can only be done by the admin or owner roles,
otherwise the transactions will be reverted. In such a way,
regstDocs cannot be recursively called by external attackers.
Clearly, as the defense mechanism (DM) just adds a small
delta (e.g., onlyAdmin() at line 10), the AVS-based code match-
ing will report the CBs with or without the modifier as vulnera-
bility candidates. In such cases, some proper post-processing
is required after the AVS-based matching, which indicates
that the DM-based RDR plays a vital role in achieving high
precision when both vulnerable and safe code patterns exist.
In reality, various DMs need to be considered to remove FPs
from results of the existing scanners (see §4.2).
3 System Overview
Basically, our approach consists of three steps:
1. Selecting the existing scanners: this step is to find some
concrete vulnerabilities to serve as the input for AVS learn-
ing, and hence our whole approach starts with the detection
results of the existing scanners (see §4.1).
2. Learning and Applying AVS: first, we adopt a clustering
algorithm to group the similar vulnerabilities of the same
type and then extract the AVS via code differencing al-
gorithm (see §5.1); then, on the basis of code matching
technique (i.e., Algorithm 1 in §5.2.2), we leverage the
AVS to search for more concrete vulnerabilities (see §5.2).
3. Summarizing and Applying RDR: during the manual au-
diting of the detection results (especially those FPs) of
the existing scanners, we inspect their detection rules and
observe the DMs in code that cause FPs. Hence, we can
refine existing good detection rules by considering DMs —
that is to conclude the RDR based on DMs (see §4.2).
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As shown in Fig. 15 (see Appendix due to space limit), the
input of our approach to build benchmark just includes the
set of unlabeled (unknown for vulnerability) smart contract
and several existing scanners, while the output consists of
a set of vulnerable smart contracts, the leaned AVS and the
summarized RDR. Notably, the final AVS and RDR can be
combined as a framework to detect the unknown vulnerability
on a new dataset.
4 Investigating Tools and Summarizing RDR
In §4, we explain how to choose the existing scanners and
how to observe the DMs from results of these tools.
4.1 Choosing Scanners
Tool Survey. We investigated 13 existing tools (see Table 8 in
Appendix). Some tools were not included in the current study
for various reasons. ZEUS is not open-sourced, and hence
we could not include it. ECHIDNA is a fuzzing library and it
requires user-defined drivers to enable vulnerability detection.
Similarly, OCTOPUS is an EVM bytecode decompiling and
analysis tool rather than an automated detection tool. Besides,
we also tried to use MYTHRIL and MYTHX (the Web version
of MYTHRIL), but MYTHRIL does not compile successfully
and the service of MYTHX is not under maintenance.2 CON-
TRACTFUZZER needs to run on a private blockchain and
makes modifications to the EVM. Also as a dynamic fuzzing
tool, CONTRACTFUZZER cannot scale up to a large dataset.
Choice of Scanners. In Table 9 in Appendix, we list the
remaining five scanners after the initial trial and show the
detection capabilities of each one. For MANTICORE, we find
that it has some performance issues when applied to perform a
large-scale detection.3 Finally, we choose SLITHER, OYENTE
and SMARTCHECK to collect the concrete vulnerabilities for
AVS extraction and RDR summarization. SECURIFY, rep-
resenting the state-of-the-art [48], was not chosen when we
summarized the DMs of the existing scanners, since at that
time SECURIFY was not open-sourced yet. However, we in-
clude SECURIFY in the tool comparison at a later time to
evaluate our final tool DOUBLADE (see §6.2).
4.2 Collecting Concrete Vulnerabilities and
Summarizing RDR considering DMs
We applied the three chosen scanners to 76,354 con-
tracts. Overall, SLITHER reports the most vulnerabilities,
in total 1244 candidates covering five types. In contrast,
SMARTCHECK reports 1,035 candidates and OYENTE reports
only 108 candidates. However, due to the internal detection
2We tried to contact the developers of MYTHRIL via emails and inquiring
on GitHub issues. However, we have not received any reply.
3We seek for help on GitHub issues, and one of the MANTICORE devel-
opers suggested us to switch to SLITHER.
1 contract BancorLender {
2 ERC20 constant public bancorToken =
3 ERC20(0x1F573D6Fb3F13d689FF844B4cE37794d79a7FF1C);
4 function closePosition(uint _idx) public {
5 assert(agets[_idx].amount > 0);
6 uint256 amount = agets[_idx].amount;
7 if (agets[_idx].borrower == 0) {
8 bancorToken.transfer(agets[_idx].lender , amount);
9 agets[_idx].amount = 0;
10 return;
11 } } }
Figure 5: CB4: a real case of using DM2 (a hard-coded ad-
dress at line 3), a FP of reentrancy for SLITHER.
mechanisms, each scanner inevitably yields some FPs. We
show some representative FP patterns below to illustrate how
the existing scanners are ignorant of the possible DMs.
FPs of Reentrancy. As the reentrancy caused some signif-
icant losses in the past [49], newly deployed contracts on
Ethereum have already adopted some DMs to prevent from
exploits of the reentrancy. We summarize the five main types
of DMs for reentrancy: DM1. access control by identity check
with owner; DM2. payment protection by hard-coding the
address of payee or payer; DM3. payment protection by
private or the self-predefined function modifier; DM4. pay-
ment protection by execution lock(s); DM5. state or balance
updating before sensitive payment. However, these DMs are
seldomly considered by the existing scanners, resulting in the
high FP rate of detection.
DM1 adds various forms of checks (i.e., in require or assert
or if) for msg.sender. For example, DM1 checks whether the
identity of msg.sender satisfies certain conditions (e.g., equal
to the owner, or with a good reputation, or having the dealing
history) before calling the external payment functions.
For DM2, in Fig. 5, according to Rule 2, CB4 is re-
ported as a reentrancy by SLITHER— firstly, it reads the
public variable agets[_idx]; then calls external function
bancorToken.transfer(); last, writes to the public variable
agets[_idx]. However, in practice, reentrancy will never be
triggered by external attackers due to the hard-coded address
constant (0x1F...FF1C) at line 3 in Fig. 5.
For DM3 of adopting user-defined modifiers for protection,
we find some interesting cases that are falsely reported by ex-
isting scanners. For example, in Fig. 4, CB3 actually takes into
account the security issue and adds the self-defined modifier
onlyAdmin() before the possibly vulnerable function regstDocs.
Since onlyAdmin() restricts that the transaction can be only
done by the admin or owner role, otherwise the transactions
will be reverted. In such a way, regstDocs could not be recur-
sively called by external attackers. Notably, for CB3 in Fig. 4,
if we changed function modifier regstDocs from onlyAdmin to
internal at line 10, SLITHER and OYENTE would still report
it as a reentrancy vulnerability — but it cannot be called by
external attackers, as it is not called in any public function.
DM4 is to prevent from the recursive entrance of the func-
tion — eliminating the issue from root. For instance, in Fig. 6,
the internal instance variable reEntered will be checked at
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1 contract ZethrBankroll is ERC223Receiving {
2 ZTHInterface public ZTHTKN;
3 bool internal reEntered;
4 function receiveDividends() public payable {
5 if (!reEntered) {
6 ...
7 if (ActualBalance > 0.01 ether) {
8 reEntered = true;
9 ZTHTKN.buyAndSetDivPercentage.value(ActualBalance
)(address(0x0), 33, "");
10 reEntered = false; }
11 }}}
12 contract ZTHInterface {
13 function buyAndSetDivPercentage(address _referredBy ,
uint8 _divChoice , string providedUnhashedPass)
public payable returns (uint);
14 }
Figure 6: CB5: a real case of using DM4 (an execution lock
of reEntered), an FP of reentrancy for SLITHER.
1 function Payout(uint a, uint b) internal onlyowner {
2 while (a>b) {
3 uint c;
4 a-=1;
5 if(Tx[a].txvalue <1000000000000000000){c=4;}
6 else if (Tx[a].txvalue >=1000000000000000000){c=6;}
7 Tx[a].txuser.send((Tx[a].txvalue/100)*c);
8 }
9 }
Figure 7: CB6 : A real case reported by SLITHER as call in
loop, which has no DoS owing to DM6 (no require at line 7).
line 5 before processing the business logic between line
8 and 10 of CB5. To prevent the reentering due to call-
ing ZTHTKN.buyAndSetDivPercentage.value(), reEntered will be
switched to true; after the transaction is done, it will be re-
verted to false to allow other transactions.
According to [15], DM5 is to finish all internal work (i.e.,
state and balance changes) and then call the external payment
function. For example, for CB3 in Fig. 4, if registered = true
at line 14 is moved before the external call regstUser.value()
at line 13, then the reentrancy attack can be avoided owing to
the failure of the check require(!registered) at line 11.
FPs of Unexpected Revert. Though SLITHER and
SMARTCHECK can detect some cases, their rules currently
are so general that most reported cases are actually bad coding
practices (e.g., warnings hinted by the IDE), not exploitable
vulnerabilities. Specifically, SLITHER reports 666 cases of
Call in Loop, as long as an external call (e.g., send() or
transfer() of other addresses) is inside a loop, regardless of
its actual impact. For instance, in Fig. 7, CB6 reported by
SLITHER does not cause expected revert, as require is not
used to check the return value of function send() at line 7.
Similarly, SMARTCHECK supports the detection of Transfer
in Loop. As SMARTCHECK checks only transfer() in a loop,
it reports a much smaller number (274) than that of SLITHER
(666). However, after manual auditing, we find that most re-
ports of SLITHER are FPs due to inconsideration of the key
require check that causes reverting. Hence, we summarize the
DM6 — no use of require for transfer in loop to avoid DoS.
According to our observation and the recent technical arti-
cle [4], the rules of Call/Transaction in Loop are neither sound
1 function withdraw() private {
2 for(uint i = 0; i < player_[uid].planCount; i++) {
3 ...
4 address sender = msg.sender;
5 sender.transfer(amount);
6 ...
7 }
8 }
Figure 8: CB7: a real FP of DoS reported by SMARTCHECK,
where only one account is involved (DM7).
nor complete to cover most of the unexpected revert cases.
At least, modifier require is ignored in these two rules, which
makes SLITHER and SMARTCHECK incapable to check pos-
sible revert operations on multiple account addresses. Here,
multiple accounts must be involved for exploiting this attack
— the failure on one account blocks other accounts via revert-
ing the operations for the whole loop. Hence, CB7 reported
by SMARTCHECK in Fig. 8 is an FP — DM7. the operations
in the loop are all on the same account (i.e., sender at line 5)
and potential revert will not affect other accounts. In addition
to reverting inside a loop, as shown in Fig. 3, there exist a few
other cases where reverting indeed happens in any unsecured
external call without loop.
FPs of Tx.Origin Abusing. For this, SLITHER reports 34
results, none of which are FPs. SLITHER’s rule is simple but
effective (see Rule 4 below), finding all Tx.Origin that appears
in the control flow condition. The rationale is that accessing
Tx.Origin is just a bad programming practice by itself, not
vulnerable. Only when used in control flow conditions, it
could be manipulated for control-flow hijack.
accesss(T x.Origin)∧ inContrFlowCondi(T x.Origin)
⇒ Tx.Origin abusing (4)
In contrast, SMARTCHECK reports much more cases (210)
than SLITHER (34), as it is more complete in considering
control flow conditions inside both functions and the modifiers
outside the function (see Rule 5). As shown in Fig. 4, the self-
defined modifier onlyAdmin() should be imported before the
function. As such a modifier is used for permission control, it
also affects the control flow of the program. The 149 FPs of
SMARTCHECK (70.95%) are due to the reason that Tx.Origin
is used for a parameter of a function call, and then the return
value of a function call is neither check nor used. However,
Tx.Origin is sometimes not abused — DM8. using Tx.Origin
for the identity check of msg.sender in control flow.
accesss(T x.Origin)∧ (inContrFlowCondi(T x.Origin)
∨ inModi f ierCode(T x.Origin))⇒ Tx.Origin abusing (5)
FPs of Unchecked Low-Level-Call. SMARTCHECK reports
this vulnerability by verifying whether the following func-
tions are under proper checks: callcode(), call(), send() and
delegatecall(). Note that checking can be done in several
ways: 1) using the built-in keyword require and assert, 2) us-
ing the if condition check, 3) using the self-defined exception-
handler class to capture the error-prone low-level-calls. Ac-
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1 function destroyDeed() public {
2 require(msg.sender == owner); // permission check
3 // if the balance is sent to the owner , destruct it
4 if (owner.send(address(this).balance)) {
5 selfdestruct(burn);}
6 }
Figure 9: CB8: a real FP of self-destruct abusing by SLITHER,
as selfdestruct() is used under two checks at line 2,4 (DM10).
cording to the paper [44], the rule in SMARTCHECK is called
unchecked external call, which checks whether calls of the
above 4 functions are inside if conditions. However, in its
implementation [11], we find that it actually checks not only
calls of the 4 low-level functions, but also calls of some user-
defined functions. Hence, checking extra calls of user-defined
functions yields 189 FPs out of 551 results. We summarize the
following DM for this type — DM9. using various forms of
checking (including if, require and assert checks) strictly
for the four restricted low-level-calls..
FPs of Self-destruct Abusing. In the existing scanners, only
SLITHER detects the misuse of self-destruct, which is called
suicidal detection. In total, SLITHER reports 46 cases of sui-
cidal via its built-in rule — as long as function selfdestruct
is used, no matter what the context is, SLITHER will report it.
Obviously, the SLITHER’s rule is too simple and too general.
It mainly works for directly calling selfdestruct without any
permission control or conditions of business logic — under
such circumstance (11 out of 46), the SLITHER rule can help
to detect the abusing. In practice, in most cases (35 out of
46) selfdestruct is called with the admin or owner permission
control or under some strict conditions in business logic. For
example, selfdestruct is indeed required in the business logic
of the CB8 in Fig. 9, as the owner wants to reset the contract
via calling selfdestruct after the transactions in a period are
all done and the contract is not active (i.e., the condition at line
2). Note that parameter burn is just padded to call selfdestruct
in a correct way. Hence, we summarize the DM10, adding a
strict condition control or a self-defined modifier for identity
check when using selfdestruct.
The precisions of these exiting scanners on 76,354 are
shown in Table 10 in Appendix. More details can be found
at the website of the benchmark. As we audit the FPs and
understand the rules of the existing scanners, we show the
rules of existing scanners in Table 12 in Appendix. In Table 1,
we show the summarized RDRs with the corresponding DMs.
In brief, for a vulnerability type, we choose the rule of the tool,
which yields a better recall, and combine this rule with the
corresponding DMs. For example, for reentrancy, we find the
rule of SLITHER yields a better recall, the RDR is based on
the SLITHER’s rule and then integrated with DM1 to DM5.
5 Learning and Applying AVS
In this section, we explain how to learn and apply AVS to
discover more similar vulnerabilities with small or big gaps.
Table 1: The RDRs are built on the rules of the existing scan-
ners and integrate the DMs unconsidered by these scanners.
Vul. Type Rule DM
Reentrancy SLITHER DM1 to DM5
Unexpected Revert SLITHER DM6, DM7
Tx.origin Abusing SMARTCHECK DM8
Unchecked L.L.C SMARTCHECK DM9
Selfdestruct Abusing SLITHER DM10
5.1 Learning AVS
We take three steps to extract the AVS from the vulnerable
CBs: 1) preprocessing the ASTs of the input CBs to miti-
gate the noise due to differences in names of variables and
constant values; 2) clustering the similar CBs via hierarchal
clustering on the basis of tree-edit distance, 3) for each cluster
of CBs, applying an efficient code differencing algorithm for
the commonality and variability analysis among the CBs, on
which AVS is extracted. Overall, the inputs of AVS-learning
are the vulnerable CBs, and it yields as the output the learned
AVS in the form of normalized ASTs.
Preprocessing. To consider both semantic and structural in-
formation of the vulnerable code, we construct the AST and
normalize the concrete data values in the AST nodes. The
AST parsing is conducted via the open-source tool, ANTLR-
based Solidity parser [9]. Proper preprocessing is applied to
the AST for retaining core information and abstracting away
unimportant differences (e.g., variable names or constant val-
ues) for the subsequent clustering step. We split the whole
AST into segments at the unit of function. For each segment
of AST that corresponds to a function, we just retain the in-
formation of node type, name, parameters and return value
(if contained); while other information (e.g., range, visibility,
stateMutability) will be discarded. For the variable names
(e.g., _indexs in Fig. 10b and _idxs in Fig. 10c), they will be
normalized with the token asterisk “∗”. Similarly, we repeat
the same normalization for constant values of the types string,
int, bytes or uint. Thus, we retain the core information and
abstract away concrete names or values, making the clustering
step sensitive to code gaps or patterns of function calls.
Clustering Vulnerable Samples. After preprocessing, a set
of normalized AST segments corresponding to functions serve
as the input for clustering. The basic idea is to perform hier-
archal clustering according to the tree-edit distance between
two ASTs [19]. In this paper, we apply a robust algorithm
for the tree edit-distance (ARTED) [40], which computes the
optimal path strategy by performing an exhaustive search in
the space of all possible path strategies. Here, path strategy
refers to a mapping between two paths of the two input trees
(or subtrees), as the distance between two (sub)trees is the
minimum distance of four smaller problems. Though ARTED
runs in quadratic time and space complexity, it is guaranteed
to perform as good or better than its competitors [40]. In Ta-
ble 2, the pair-wise tree edit distances among the four CBs are
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(a) CB9: a sample considered as the
original copy.
(b) CB10: the sample where state-
ment 8 is moved to statement 2.
(c) CB11: the sample having an extra
parameter and a modified statement 5.
Figure 10: Three similar CBs of reentrancy that are found in real-world contracts.
Table 2: AST-based tree-edit distance between CB pairs.
CB3 CB9 CB10 CB11
CB3 0 52 60 57
CB9 52 0 16 7
CB10 60 16 0 23
CB11 57 7 23 0
listed after applying ARTED on their normalized ASTs. As
shown, the distances between the CBs in Fig. 10 are small —
indicating the three CBs are very similar. With the complete-
linkage clustering [18], the dendrogram of clustering results
is shown in Fig.11. If we choose the height as 50 (intuitively,
about the gaps of 5 statements), we can rightly group CB9,
CB10 and CB11 into one cluster and C3 alone in another.
AVS Extraction. After we cluster the similar vulnerabilities
together, we need to summarize the commonality and vari-
ability among them for automated extraction of the AVS that
represents their generic form. Towards this goal, we apply the
open-source code differencing tool, MCIDIFF [30], which can
detect differences across multiple instances of code clones in
linear comparison times. The idea is inspired from the concept
of progressive alignment [21] that proves to be quite effective
in multiple DNA sequence alignment. Rather than have a
pair-wise comparison of time complexity O(n2), MCIDIFF
compares n similar CBs in n−1 times. Details of MCIDIFF
are omitted due to page limit, interested readers can refer
to [30]. For the CBs in Fig. 10, it first compares two samples
(CB9 and CB11) with the least tree-edit distance, then gradu-
ally compares with others (CB10), and finally automatically
gets the AVS in Fig. 18 (see Appendix). Besides, the AVS to
match CB1 and CB2 in Fig. 3 is shown in Fig. 12.
Figure 11: Hierarchical clustering via complete-linkage for
AST-base tree-edit distances among CBs in Fig. 3 and Fig. 10.
5.2 AVS-based Vulnerability Matching
The matching method is expected to be robust, succeeding
in pairing up CB1 with CB2 in Fig.3, CB9, CB10 and CB11
together in Fig. 10, regardless the size of gaps. Besides, the
algorithm should also consider the execution order of the
statements, since some vulnerabilities (e.g., reentrancy) are
strongly dependent on the statement execution order. Under
such circumstance, our AVS-based code matching approach is
on the basis of CFG rather than AST that ignores the control
flow of a program. The matching process includes the follow-
ing two steps: 1) generating and preprocessing the CFG from
the AST of AVS; 2) applying our code matching algorithm
based on the longest common sequence (LCS) [32] and se-
quence inclusion check. The input of AVS-based matching
includes the AST of the AVS and the contracts to be scanned;
the output are detected vulnerabilities in the contracts.
5.2.1 Generating and Preprocessing CFG
To match CB1 with CB2, in Fig. 12, we show the AVS in
the form of an AST that has been normalized. As the AVS
should be compact and represent the core part of the relevant
similar CBs, under the help of human expertise, the final form
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Figure 12: The exemplar AVS for CB1 in Fig. 3a in the form
of a normalized AST segment.
of AST owns just three statements (statement 6,7,8 in Fig. 3a)
and has variable names and values normalized (in gray back-
ground color in Fig. 12). Then, the AST can be used for CFG
generation. The conversion process from AST to CFG is in-
spired by SLITHER, following the implementation routine in
SLITHERIR [20]. In Fig. 17 (see Appendix), we show the
CFG that is converted from the AST form of the AVS in Fig.
12 and also contains the IR inside each node of the CFG. Be-
fore matching, the standard CFG requires to be preprocessed
in two steps of normalization. First, the differences in vari-
able names and constant values need to be abstracted away
as we do that for AST. For the CFG of the AVS, this step is
always done in the process of learning the AVS. However,
for the CFGs of the code to be scanned, the step is done in
the traversal of IR instructions inside the CFG. For example,
no matter currentLeader in Fig. 3a or bettor in Fig. 3b will be
normalized with the placeholder *DEST*; similarly, highestBid
and win will be replaced with the placeholder *VALUE*. Second,
the CFG will be normalized and flattened in order to remove
all the loops inside, as the following code matching algorithm
works on the IR sequence in the CFG nodes. Hence, to re-
move loops, we remove the transition from the last node back
to the beginning node of the loop. Then, to flatten the CFG,
we apply the Breadth-First-Search (BFS) algorithm.
5.2.2 Applying the Code Matching Algorithm on CFG
Algo. 1 shows the work flow of AVS-based matching, which
takes as input the two sequences (the signature S1 and the
target S2) and the predefined similarity threshold η, and fi-
nally yields a boolean value bm indicating the result. Basically,
Algo. 1 takes two steps: matching based on LCS at line 12
or on subsequence inclusion check at line 14. First, if with a
similar length, the two sequences can be directly matched by
LCS algorithm at line 1–2; if the target is much larger than the
signature, the LCS with sliding window will be employed at
line 3–10. Last, if not matched by LCS, the sequence inclusion
check will be applied — function isIncludedByOrder checks
whether every node in S1 appears and follows the same order
as that in S2. As the workflow of Algo. 1 has the time com-
plexity O(n) and LCS is O(nlog2n) in our implementation,
the overall time complexity is O(n2log2n).
Algorithm 1: Code Matching based on CFG IR nodes
input :S1, the signature sequence of the AVS
input :S2, the target sequence of code to be scanned
input :η, the threshold of the similarity% be matched
output :bm, the boolean result of matching
1 if |S2| ≤ 1η ×|S1| then
2 σ← LCS(S1,S2)
3 else if |S2|> 1η ×|S1| then
4 pos = 0
5 while pos≤ |S2| do
6 St ← SubSequence(S2, pos, 1η ×|S1|)
7 σt ← LCS(S1,St)
8 if σt > σ then
9 σ← σt
10 pos← pos+ itv //set interval for the window
11 if σ≥ η then
12 bm← true, return bm //return using LCS
13 else
14 bm← isIncludedByOrder(S1,S2), return bm //return
using subsequence inclusion check
This algorithm can effectively match the CB pairs in Fig. 3
or Fig. 10, using any one in the pair as the signature and the
other as the target. For the CBs with a small gap in Fig. 10, as
they have the close length, the LCS can directly match them
with a code similarity of 75%. For the pair with big gaps in
Fig. 3, the method LCS() at line 7 actually fails. In contrast,
our algorithm successes owing to isIncludedByOrder() at line
14 — the CFG IR sequence of AVS for CB1 in Fig. 12 appears
with the exactly same order as that in the flattened IR sequence
of the CFG of CB2. Thus, with the proper AVS, the code
matching approach can also effectively mitigate the big gaps.
Besides the bool result bm, our approach can specify the
possible position of a vulnerability as finer-grained as state-
ment level, accord to the part of S2 that is matched with S1.
6 Evaluation
Experimental Environment. Throughout the evaluation, all
the steps are conducted on a machine running on Ubuntu
18.04, with 8 core 2.10GHz Intel Xeon E5-2620V4 processor,
32 GB RAM, and 4 TB HDD. For the scanners used in eval-
uation, no multithreading options are available and only the
by-default setting is used for them.
Dataset for Benchmark Construction. We implement a
web crawler to download Solidity files from accounts of Ether-
scan [1], a famous third-party website on Ethereum block ex-
plorer. When we started crawling, public users are allowed to
freely download Solidity files. However, since the beginning
of 2019, only 1000 accounts of recently verified contracts
can be accessed on Etherscan per day. Finally, we crawl from
18714 accounts and get 76,354 contracts. The crawler adopts
a random search strategy on the webpages of Etherscan to
assure the randomness of downloaded contracts.
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Figure 13: #Vulnerabilities of each type in the benchmark.
“Our Unique.” means those found only by DOUBLADE.
Dataset for Tool Evaluation. As we observe the DMs and
rules of existing tools on the 76,354 contracts, it will be unfair
to evaluate the resulted tool (the finally learned AVS and the
summarized RDRs) on that dataset. Hence, we get another
address list of contracts from Google BigQuery Open Dataset.
After removing the addresses that are already in those of the
76,354 contracts, we get the other 17,770 real-world contracts
deployed on Ethereum, on which we fairly compare our re-
sulted tool DOUBLADE with the latest version of the scanners:
SLITHER v0.6.4. OYENTE v0.2.7, SMARTCHECK v2.0 and
SECURIFY v1.0 that is open-sourced at Dec 2018.
Research Questions (RQs). With three state-of-the-art scan-
ners and two collected datasets, we aim to answer these RQs:
RQ1. What is the quality of the constructed benchmark? Are
the AVS representative and are vulnerabilities valid?
RQ2. How is the accuracy of our resulted tool, compared
with the existing scanners in detecting vulnerability?
RQ3. How is the efficiency of our resulted tool, in building
vulnerability benchmark and also in tool comparison?
6.1 RQ1: Evaluating the AVS and the Re-
sulted Vulnerability Benchmark
During the process of applying our approach (AVS and RDRs)
to detect vulnerability, the important intermediate results in-
clude the totally learned AVS. Besides, on the 76,354 con-
tracts, the final results include the union of TPs reported by
all tools, which constitutes the vulnerability benchmark.
Collecting Representative AVS. Based on the TPs reported
by the existing scanners, we automatically extract the AVS.
In Table 3, we show the number of the extracted AVS for
each vulnerability type. Totally, from the existing TPs we
learn 42 AVS, 47.6% of which are of reentrancy — indi-
cating the various forms of reentrancy vulnerability. For ex-
ample, for the 96 TPs of reentrancy found by SLITHER and
OYENTE, we apply the AST tree-edit distance based cluster-
ing method and get 24 clusters (when setting the cluster width
to 100 edits). After manual inspection, we find 20 clusters
are representative and can serve as the AVS for discovering
more unknown ones. For example, for some functions (e.g.,
buyFirstTokens, sellOnApprove, sendEthProportion and so on),
we find their cloned instances of an extent of similarity due to
the copy-paste-modify paradigm. For these cloned instances,
we apply the code differencing to extract the AVS and further
refine the AVS to retain the core parts via manual inspection.
Table 3: The number of AVS for each vulnerability type.
Reen-
ntrancy
Tx
Origin
Unchecked
L.-L.-C.
Unex-
pected
Revert
Self
Des-
truct
#AVS 20 5 4 8 5
For unexpected revert, we also find there exist some cloned
instances between TPs. Especially, for the two typical sce-
nario of unexpected revert — the revert on single account
(see Fig. 3) and the revert due to failed operations on multiple
accounts via a loop, we get totally 8 AVS via clustering more
than 200 TPs that are reported by SLITHER or OYENTE.
For three other vulnerability types, we cannot get clusters
of cloned function instances due to the fact that the triggering
of vulnerability requires not much context. As the remaining
types are all about improper checks, we design 4 or 5 AVS for
each type. For example, regarding Tx.origin abusing, the ex-
isting scanners mainly check whether it is inside if statement.
We extend this with more AVS, such as checking Tx.origin
inside require, assert and if-throw. Last, for unchecked low-
level-call, 4 AVS are used to catch the improper low-level
calls in loop without any validation check on return values,
for call(), callcode(), delegatecall() and send().
Unionizing TPs of Various Tools. To identify the TPs of ex-
isting tools, some manual effort is inevitable. Still, we adopt
some strategy to speed up the manual auditing process mean-
while achieving the accuracy of auditing. For example, if a vul-
nerability is reported by two or more tools among SLITHER,
OYENTE, SMARTCHECK and SECURIFY, one researcher will
manually check whether it is a TP. Otherwise if it is reported
by only one tool, two researchers will check this, and the
third researcher will be involved if they give different manual
auditing results. After gathering and unionizing the TPs of
all tools, we could build up the benchmark that is of high
confidence. As shown in Fig. 13, the vulnerability benchmark
consists of totally 1,219 vulnerability instances. Reentrancy
and unchecked low-level-call still constitute a considerable
part, while Tx.Origin abusing and self destruct are much fewer
than what we expected. Finally, we publish all the 1,219 TPs
of five vulnerability types on the benchmark website [6].
Dynamic Confirmation of TPs. To confirm the validity of
detected TPs of vulnerabilities, we further sample some of
the instances and manage to trigger the vulnerability on our
local server. Specifically, for vulnerabilities found by each
AVS in Table 3, we randomly pick up two samples from them.
For each selected sample, we identify all the contracts it de-
pends on and copy them into the local testing project on our
local server. The reason that we just choose two samples of
each AVS for confirmation is twofold: 1). The vulnerabili-
ties matched by the same AVS will be similar and could be
triggered in similar ways; 2). Triggering a concrete vulnera-
bility requires the customization of the attack code, which is
currently manually done via human expert (see attack code
in [6]). Notably, automated attack code customization for
vulnerability triggering will be out of the scope of this study.
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Table 4: The detection accuracy at contract level for our tool and other existing ones on the 17,770 contract, where #N refers to
the number of detections, P% and R% refer to the precision rate and the recall rate among the number of detections, respectively.
Note that P%= (#TP of the tool)/#N, and R%= (#TP of the tool)/ (#TP in union of all tools).
Vulnerability SLITHER v0.6.4 OYENTE v0.2.7 SMARTCHECK v2.0 SECURIFY v1.0 DOUBLADE
#N P% R% #N P% R% #N P% R% #N P% R% #N P% R%
Reentrancy 133 15.8% 34.4% 28 14.3% 6.6% × 392 4.3% 26.2% 101 27.7% 45.9%
Abuse of tx.origin 18 44.4% 28.6% × 44 40.9% 64.3% × 58 43.1% 89.3%
Unchecked L.L.C 29 100.0% 44.6% × 130 26.2% 52.3% × 64 89.1% 89.2%
Unexpected Revert 222 10.4% 60.5% × 46 65.2% 78.9% × 45 75.6% 89.5%
Self Destruct 17 17.6% 37.5% × × × 45 15.6% 87.5%
Table 5: #FPs due to the inconsideration or unsatisfactory
support of DMs for different tools on the 17,770 contracts.
SLI. OYE. SEC. S.C. D.B.
DM1 25 2 45 × 4
DM2 42 4 126 × 11
DM3 16 15 106 × 36
DM4 9 0 1 × 0
DM5 5 1 13 × 13
DM6 12 × × 0 0
DM7 41 × × 16 11
DM8 10 × × 26 33
DM9 0 × × 26 7
DM10 14 × × × 38
6.2 RQ2: Evaluating the Resulted Tool
As mentioned in §4.2 and §6.1, we have learned 42 AVS
and 10 DMs in total for the five types of vulnerabilities. To
evaluate the effectiveness of the resulted AVS and DM-based
RDRs, we apply them on the 17,770 newly collected contracts
and compare with the latest version of existing tools. Details
on the accuracy of each tool for every type are shown in
Table 4. We identify the TPs of each tool via manual auditing,
as the detection number for each tool is still acceptable.
6.2.1 Reasons for Low FPs of of DOUBLADE
In Table 4, we list 313 detection results of DOUBLADE, with
an overall precision of 48.2%, regardless of vulnerability
types. In comparison, SLITHER has a total precision of 20.1%;
OYENTE’s total precision is 14.3%; SMARTCHECK’s total
precision is 37.3%; and SECURIFY’s total precision is surpris-
ingly only 4.3%. We analyze the FP rates of these tools from
the perspective of supporting DMs mentioned in §4.2.
FPs of Reentrancy. Among the four supported tools ex-
cept SMARTCHECK, DOUBLADE yields the lowest FP rate
(72.3%) owing to the adoptions of DM1-5 for reentrancy. FP
rates of other tools are even higher. For example, the FP rate
of SECURIFY is 95.7%, as its detection pattern is too general
but has not considered any possible DM in code. SLITHER
adopts Rule 2 in §2.3 to detect, but it supports no DMs — its
recall is acceptable, but FP rate is high. OYENTE adopts Rule
3 in §4.2 and has no DMs — its recall is low due to the strict
rule, and its FP rate is also high.
FPs of Unexpected Revert. As summarized in §4.2,
SLITHER reports all calls in loops as vulnerable, which leads
to 53 FPs. SMARTCHECK handles DM6 but not DM7. In com-
parison, DOUBLADE handles DM6 well and partially supports
DM7, yielding the lowest FP rate.
FPs of Tx.Origin Abusing. SLITHER has a strict rule for
detecting this type, only checking the existence of Tx.Origin
== msg.sender. For the case that msg.sender is assigned to vari-
able owner and then Tx.Origin == owner is checked, SLITHER
does not detect, causing FNs. SMARTCHECK and DOUBLADE
manage to include all the identity check cases, but meanwhile
also lead to FPs due to the fact — accurate symbolic analysis
is not adopted in SMARTCHECK or DOUBLADE to suggest
whether Tx.Origin can be used to rightly replace msg.sender.
Hence, the FP rate due to DM8 is high for DOUBLADE.
FPs of Unchecked Low-Level-Call. SLITHER has no FPs on
this type, as it strictly checks the usage of the four low-level
calls. In contrast, SMARTCHECK does not handle DM9, and
causes 96 FPs by checking some high-level calls. DOUBLADE
has 7 FPs, marking 7 cases as unchecked ones, where the
return values of low-level calls are used as local variables
and checked in late code. Hence, these 7 FPs require data
dependency analysis to find that whether it is checked.
FPs of Self-destruct Abusing. DOUBLADE has 38 FPs. After
inspecting, we find 30 FPs are due to the unsatisfactory han-
dling of DM10 that hides in self-defined modifiers. SLITHER
has a better FP rate. It shares some FPs due to the self-defined
modifiers, and reports safe self-destruct as abusing in 10 FPs.
Summary. Our DM-based RDRs can significantly reduce
FPs in most cases. Only for DM3, DM8 and DM10, when
AVS-based code matching provides many vulnerability can-
didates with complicated self-defined modifiers or the usage
of many local variables for value passing, these three DMs
are not satisfactorily handled. To address this, accurate data
dependency analysis on self-defined modifiers is required.
6.2.2 Reasons for High Recall of DOUBLADE
In Table 4, in most cases, DOUBLADE yields the best re-
call except on unchecked low-level-calls, where R% for
SMARTCHECK is 52.3% and R% for DOUBLADE is 89.2%.
Based on the AVS learned from the 76,354 contracts, we ex-
pect DOUBLADE can find more similar vulnerable candidates.
Unique TPs of Reentrancy. DOUBLADE finds 25 unique
TPs of this type that are missed by other evaluated tools.
We find that the other three tools commonly fail to consider
the user-defined function transfer(), not the built-in payment
function transfer(). For the CB in Fig. 14, SLITHER and SE-
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Table 6: The number of vulnerabilities that are found by the
different numbers of tools in Table 4. Column “Only D.B.”
refers to the vulnerability number only found by DOUBLADE.
One Two More than two Only D.B.
Reentrancy 59 0 3 25
Tx.origin 10 13 5 10
L.L.C 24 26 15 17
Revert 5 17 16 2
Selfdestruct 6 2 × 5
CURIFY miss it as they mainly check the external call for low-
level functions (e.g., send(), value()) and built-in transfer().
OYENTE does not report this CB, as it fails in the balance
check according to Rule 3. However, DOUBLADE detects
this vulnerability, as we have an AVS that has a high code
similarity with this CB. Notably, there are also 34 TPs missed
by DOUBLADE, which is due to the fact that reentrancy has
many forms and our AVS is not sufficient to cover those TPs.
Unique TPs of Unexpected Revert. For this type, DOU-
BLADE reports 2 unique TPs among all 5 unique TPs that are
found by only one tool. Interestingly, most TPs for this type
are found by at least two tools — the detection mechanisms
behind might be similar and our AVS works. The reason for
3 other TPs missed by DOUBLADE is that we fail to consider
the assert check for money transfer inside loop, which will
similarly cause the DoS as the failed require check does.
Unique TPs of Tx.Origin Abusing. For this type, DOU-
BLADE reports 10 unique TPs among all 10 unique TPs that
are found by only one tool — all unique ones are found by
DOUBLADE. The reason is that we have the AVS of using
Tx.Origin for identity check in self-defined modifiers. Espe-
cially, the check origin != owner in self-defined modifiers are
TPs commonly missed by other evaluated tools.
Unique TPs of Unchecked Low-Level-Call. Among the 24
unique TPs that are found by only one tool, DOUBLADE finds
about 17 unique ones, where the low-level-calls appearing
in if statements are still unchecked. For example, the state-
ment if(success) {send();} will be reported as non-vulnerable
(i.e., being checked), according to the rules in SLITHER and
SMARTCHECK (their rule is to judge whether the low-level-
calls are inside an if statement). To address this, DOUBLADE
has AVS to match the above FNs for other evaluated tools.
However, there are 7 TPs that are all missed by DOUBLADE.
After inspecting, we find that these return values of low-level-
calls are not immediately checked after calling, but checked
after several or even many lines of other operations in the if
statement. Due to the fact that accurate data-flow analysis is
not adopted for this, DOUBLADE fails to detect these TPs.
However, SLITHER and SMARTCHECK rightly detect these
TPs, since low-level-calls are inside if statements.
Unique TPs of Self-destruct Abusing. For this type, DOU-
BLADE reports 5 unique TPs among all 6 unique TPs that are
found by only one tool. As our AVS is a little general and
considers self-defined modifiers, the recall of DOUBLADE
(87.5%) is much better than SLITHER (37.5%). Hence, the
1 contract Alice {
2 ...
3 function aliceClaimsPayment(bytes32 _dId , uint
_amount , address _addr) external {
4 require(deals[_dId].state == DS.Initialized);
5 ...
6 deals[_dId].state = DS.PaymentSentToAlice;
7 if (_addr == 0x0) {msg.sender.transfer(_amount);}
8 else {
9 ERC20 token = ERC20(_addr);
10 assert(token.transfer(msg.sender , _amount)); }
11 }
12 }
Figure 14: CB12: a real case of reentrancy, a TP for DOU-
BLADE but a FN for SLITHER, OYENTE and SECURIFY. The
attack code and explanation for this reentrancy vulnerability
is shown in Fig. 19 in Appendix.
high recall is achieved at the cost of lowering the precision
(15.6%). Notably, 1 unique TP is missed by DOUBLADE,
but detected by SLITHER. This case is still considered as
abusing of self-destruct, as no permission check exists be-
fore calling selfdestruct — statement {require(this.balance
== 0); selfdestruct(owner);}
Summary. Based on various AVS learned from 76,354 con-
tracts, DOUBLADE detects more unique TPs than any other
evaluated tool, especially for types that own obvious code
patterns (e.g., reentrancy, unexpected revert and Tx.origin
abusing). On unchecked low-level-calls, DOUBLADE needs
to support accurate data-flow analysis, which is required to
judge whether the return value is checked on a long path.
6.3 RQ3: Evaluating the Efficiency
On Dataset for Benchmark Construction. In Table 7,
SLITHER takes the least time (only 156 min) in detection.
SMARTCHECK and DOUBLADE have the comparable detec-
tion time (500~1000 min). They are essentially of the same
type of technique — pattern based static analysis. In practice,
they may differ in performance due to implementation differ-
ences, but still they are significantly faster than OYENTE that
applies symbolic execution. Compared with other dynamic
analysis or verification tools (i.e., MYTHRILL and SECU-
RIFY that cannot finish in three days for the 76,354 contracts),
OYENTE is quite efficient. Notably, the AVS learning time of
DOUBLADE is not included in the detection time, as it could
be done off-line separately. Since AVS learning is analogical
to rules formulation, it is not counted in the detection time.
On Dataset for Tool Evaluation. On the smaller dataset, we
observe the similar pattern of time execution — SLITHER is
the most efficient, OYENTE is least efficient (except SECU-
RIFY), and SMARTCHECK and DOUBLADE have the compa-
rable efficiency. Notably, SECURIFY can finish the detection
on 17,770 contracts, but it takes significantly more time than
other tools. The performance issue of SECURIFY rises due to
the conversion of EVM IRs into datalog representation and
then the application of verification technique. OYENTE is also
less efficient, as it relies on symbolic execution for analysis. In
theory, DOUBLADE should be comparable to SMARTCHECK
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Table 7: The time (min.) of vulnerability detection for each
scanner on 76,354 contracts. × means timeout in 72 hours.
Dataset SLITHER OYENTE S.C. SECURIFY DOUBLADE
76,354 156 6434 641 × 883
17,770 52 1352 141 8859 295
and SLITHER, as these three all adopt rule based matching
analysis. The extra overheads of DOUBLADE, compared with
SMARTCHECK and SLITHER, are AVS-based code matching.
6.4 Discussion
The Necessity of Manual Effort. The efforts in our approach
mainly lie in the investigation of the existing scanners used in
our study (§4.2). Towards a high-quality vulnerability bench-
mark, identifying the TPs from results of existing tools is a
inevitable task. Although two or more tools may agree on
some cases, the manual audit is still required to confirm that.
AVS could be learned automatically (§5.1), but the DM sum-
marization must rely on human expertise. Last, with the final
AVS and RDRs, the experiments in §6.2 need human expert
to count the TPs and calculate the precision and recall. For
ease of public review, we publish the vulnerability dataset and
tool comparison results in the website [6].
7 Related Work
Vulnerability Detection in Smart Contracts. As listed in
Table 8 in Appendix, there are mainly 13 security scanners
on smart contracts. From the perspective of software analysis,
these scanners could be categorized into static- or dynamic-
based. In the former category, SLITHER [47] aims to be the
analysis framework that runs a suite of vulnerability detectors.
OYENTE [31, 33] analyzes the bytecode of the contracts and
applies Z3-solver [17] to conduct symbolic executions. Re-
cently, SMARTCHECK [11,44] translates Solidity source code
into an XML-based IR and defines the XPath-based patterns
to find code issues. SECURIFY [10, 48], a tool that can work
on the EVM code, is proposed to detect the vulnerability via
compliance (or violation) patterns to guarantee that certain
behaviors are safe (or unsafe, respectively). These static tools
usually adopt symbolic execution or verification techniques,
being relevant to DOUBLADE. However, none of them ap-
plies code-similarity based matching technique or takes into
account the possible DMs in code to prevent from attacks.
There are some other tools that enable the static analysis
for smart contracts. ZEUS [25] adopts XACML as a language
to write the safety and fairness properties, converts them into
LLVM IR [2] and then feeds them to a verification engine
such as SEAHORN [23]. Besides, there is another EVM byte-
code decompiling and analysis frame, namely OCTOPUS [3],
which needs the users to define the patterns for vulnerability
detections. To prevent the DAO, Grossman et al. propose the
notion of effectively Callback Free (ECF) objects in order to
allow callbacks without preventing modular reasoning [22].
MAIAN is presented to detect greedy, prodigal, and suicidal
contracts [37], and hence the vulnerabilities to address differ
from the types we address in this paper. The above tools are
relevant, but due to various reasons (issues in tool availabil-
ity or supported types), we cannot have a direct comparison
between DOUBLADE and them.
The less relevant category includes dynamic testing
or fuzzing tools: MANTICORE [46], MYTHRIL [13],
MYTHX [14], ECHIDNA [45] and ETHRACER [28].
MYTHRIL and MYTHX use the advanced techniques (e.g.,
concolic testing and tainting) for detection. In addition, re-
searchers also propose the testing-based tool MANTICORE
and the fuzzing library ECHIDNA or tool ETHRACER. Dy-
namic tools often target certain vulnerability types and pro-
duce results with a low FP rate. However, they are unsuitable
for a large-scale detection due to the efficiency issue.
Code-similarity based Vulnerability Detection. In general,
similar-code matching technique is widely adopted for vulner-
ability detection. In 2016, VULPECKER [29] is proposed to
apply different code-similarity algorithms in various purposes
for different vulnerability types. It leverages vulnerability sig-
natures from National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [38] and
applies them to detect 40 vulnerabilities that are not published
in NVD, among which 18 are zero-days. As VULPECKER
works on the source code of C, BINGO [12] can execute on
binary code and compare the assembly code via tracelet (par-
tial trace of CFG) extraction [16] and similarity measuring.
Recently, VUDDY [27] represents the state-of-the-art on con-
struction of vulnerability benchmark of C. To sum up, these
studies usually resort to the vulnerability database of C lan-
guage for discovering similar zero-days. In contrast, plenty
of our efforts are exhausted in gathering vulnerabilities from
other tools for smart contracts and auditing them manually.
Besides, VUDDY [27] targets at exact clones and parameter-
ized clones, not gapped clones, as it utilizes hashing for match-
ing for the purpose of high efficiency. DOUBLADE adopts a
more robust algorithm, which can tolerate big or small code
gaps across the similar candidates of a vulnerability.
8 Conclusion
So far, a few works have exposed various vulnerabilities in
smart contracts [5, 7, 34] and plenty of scanners have been
presented to detect the security issues. Yet, to the best knowl-
edge of ours, there is no study on building a vulnerability
benchmark for smart contracts. In this paper, we apply three
state-of-the-art scanners, learn the AVS from the TPs of their
results, and summarize the DM-based RDRs from FPs of their
results. Then, we combine the AVS and the DM-based RDRs
in our tool, namely DOUBLADE, for achieving both precision
and recall in building vulnerability benchmark and detect-
ing unknown vulnerabilities. In future, we will support more
vulnerability types and integrate with verification techniques.
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Appendix
Figure 15: System diagram.
Table 8: The state-of-art tools for Solidity analysis.
Tool Name Github Stars Method Technique Open Source Implementation Adopted In Experiment
MYTHRIL 1177 Dynamic Conclic Testing Yes Python ×
MYTHX n.a. Dynamic Conclic Testing No n.a. ×
SLITHER 247 Static CFG Analysis Yes Python X
ECHIDNA 306 Dynamic Fuzzy Testing Yes Haskell ×
MANTICORE 1546 Dynamic Testing Yes Python ×
OYENTE 663 Static Symbolic Analysis Yes Python X
SECURIFY 129 Static Datalog Analysis Yes Java X
SMARTCHECK 47 Static AST Analysis Yes Java X
OCTOPUS 153 Static Reverse Analysis Yes Python ×
ZEUS n.a. Static Formal Verification No n.a. ×
CONTRACTFUZZER 34 Dynamic Fuzzy Testing Yes Go ×
MAIAN 238 Static Symbolic Analysis Yes Python ×
ETHRACER 1 Dynamic Fuzzy Testing Yes Python ×
Table 9: Detection scope of various scanners for the top ten vulnerability types. Note that since v0.6.4, SLITHER supports
unchecked low-level-call.
Vulnerability Name SLITHER OYENTE MANTICORE SECURIFY SMARTCHECK
Reentrancy X X X X ×
Abuse of Tx-origin X × X × X
Arithmetic Issues × X X × ×
Unchecked Low-level-call X × X × X
Unexpected Revert × × × X X
Bad Randomness × × × X X
Front Running × × × × ×
Time Manipulation X X × × X
Short Address × × × × ×
Self-destruct Abusing X × X × ×
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Table 10: The number of detected vulnerabilities at contract level and true positive (TP) rate of each scanner.
Vulnerability (Precision
Rate)
SLITHER
V.0.4.6
OYENTE
V0.2.7
SMARTCHECK
V2.0
Reentrancy 498 (9.24%) 108 (50.93%) ×
Abuse of Tx Origin 34 (100%) × 210 (29.05%)
Unchecked Low-Level-Call × × 551 (65.70%)
Unexpected Revert 666 (35.29%) × 274 (93.79%)
Self Destruct 46 (23.91%) × ×
1 contract Attacker {
2 address victimAddress;
3 function setVictimAddress(address _victim){ victimAddress = _victim; }
4 function startAttack(){ bytes4 methodId = bytes4(keccak256("bet()")); victimAddress.call(methodId); }
5 function(){ revert(); } }
Figure 16: The attack that can exploit the vulnerability of CB2 in Fig. 3b. Attackers call revert() in the fallback function. Once
highestBidder.transfer(fundsByBidder[highestBidder]) in victim contract is executed, the fallback function will be triggered and
the revert will happen.
Figure 17: The exemplar CFG converted from the AVS in Fig. 12.
Figure 18: The AVS for matching the three CBS in Fig. 10.
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Table 11: The corresponding real address of the CBs shown in this paper.
Figure Address
CB2 0x8ac132345132d3c36b55b375f04d22029e71547e
CB3 0xfb1af109fc82685451a192ad86c2084183f0f2d6
CB4 0xe4e821c1aef1d3305ade82835853d87d2705a992
CB5 0x818189b1a0ba4f9e543de04eb76669ec8354e122
CB6 0x7d7dde4b196a237879e448fc4b69b8647c124932
CB7 0xcd039b3a5c4afa255757beec7eed4da06094c374
CB8 0xb52511f49f3ed76ad1f77998985ee452f29ba0fd
CB9 0xE98318BCEB661013991CF2C862207964194CC25C
CB11 0x819AE35E142D86401BF2DE6622EB6FFE8DD89B9C
CB12 0xc302cedd1be4fd7053147b9e298077d9392f7584
1 contract Attack {
2 address victim;
3 bytes32 did;
4 uint expectMoney;
5 uint count = 1; // Initialize the reentrant times
6 function setVictim(address _victim) private {
7 victim = _victim; // Set to the address of contract Alice of Figure14
8 }
9 function setExpectMoney(uint amount) {
10 expectMoney = amount;
11 }
12 function setDid(bytes32 _did) private {
13 did = _did; // Set the appropriate value to meet ’require condition’
14 }
15 function transfer(address _addr , uint _amount){ // attack method
16 if (count <= 5) { // Suppose reentrant 5 times
17 victim.call(bytes4(keccak256("aliceClaimsPayment(bytes32 , uint , address)")), did, expectMoney , this);
18 count++;
19 }
20 victim.call(bytes4(keccak256("aliceClaimsPayment(bytes32 , uint , address)")), did, expectMoney , 0x0);
21 }
22 function() payable{}
23 }
Figure 19: The attack that can exploit the vulnerability of CB12 in Fig. 14. The vulnerable function in CB12 has no DM of access
control (e.g. modifiers). The attacker can set the victim address by setVictim function. Once the attacker runs aliceClaimsPayment
in CB12 and passes the address of the attack contract as an argument _addr, the control flow goes to line 10, then the transfer
function in attacker’s code is called. Hence, a function call loop is formed. The code of line 8 and 9 in CB12 could be reentranted
several times but can not send any ethers. After 5 times of reentrant, the attacker changes the argument _addr to 0x0, then the
control flow goes to line 7 in CB12 and ethers are sent to the attacker.
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